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**SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER:**

The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas

Edited by
Max G. Manwaring


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**SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER:
THE USE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AMERICAS**

**An Anthology from a Symposium Cosponsored by
The Chief of Staff, United States Army,
The George Bush School
of Government and Public Service,
and The U.S. Army War College**

**Max G. Manwaring
Editor**

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September 1999

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FOREWORD

In December 1998, the U.S. Army War College joined with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University to cosponsor a conference entitled "The Use of Land Forces in the Americas." It was held on December 15, 1998, at the Bush School and was hosted by the President of Texas A&M University—Kingsville, Lieutenant General Marc Cisneros, USA (Retired).

The conference brought together over 100 prominent U.S. academic, civilian governmental, and military leaders and some distinguished Latin American scholars. It was designed to support U.S. and Latin American goals that were first articulated in President Bush's "The Enterprise for the Americas" speech in June 1990. Our mutual goals as neighbors in the hemisphere are to promote democracy, encourage stability, preserve the peace, and provide for our nations' common well-being now and into the 21st century.

The various presentations, the level and scope of participation, the candor of the dialogue, the outstanding support provided by the cosponsors, and the relaxed atmosphere generated by the personal efforts of General Cisneros and former President Bush all contributed to a forward-looking and fruitful meeting. This book stems from the symposium, however it is not a comprehensive record of the proceedings. Rather, the book is organized as an anthology of the best of a series of excellent symposium presentations, revised in light of the discussions that took place there, and complemented by an explanation of the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America and an overview. The anthology examines the major political, economic, and social trends in Latin America; strategic issues that relate to the use of U.S. armed forces in the Americas; and, civil-military relations for now and the future.

Hopefully, this book will stimulate our readers to reflect more deeply upon the cogent issues discussed at the conference that affect the vital interests of the entire hemisphere.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Larry M. Wortzel". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "L".

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Donald E. Schulz

The end of the Cold War has witnessed a major transformation of the international security environment. The Evil Empire is no more. Yet, early predictions that we were entering a “New World Order” have proven premature. The growing chaos in Russia, the Asian economic crisis, the bloodbaths in the Balkans and Central Africa, the U.S.-Iraq war, the spread of non-state threats (e.g., from terrorists and drug mafias), and other dangers to international peace and stability suggest that, while the old order has changed, a new one has yet to emerge. In many respects, indeed, the current milieu bears as much resemblance to a “New World Disorder” as anything else.¹

Latin America is no exception. While considerable progress has been made on some fronts—especially with regard to democratization and the adoption of market reforms—there has been a tendency to overlook or underestimate growing disintegrative forces in countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. At the same time, there remain significant “holdover” threats to the consolidation of democracy and regional stability. As a consequence, this chapter discusses current U.S. national interests in the region and assesses their relative importance to the United States.

The Importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to U.S. National Interests.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of “Engagement” is built on three core objectives: (1) Creating a stable, peaceful international security environment in which our nation,

citizens and interests are not threatened; (2) Continuing American economic prosperity through increasingly open international trade and sustainable growth in the global economy; and, (3) The promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.²

At the same time, U.S. interests can be grouped into three categories: *Vital Interests*—that is, those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation; *Important Interests*—those which, while not affecting national survival, do affect our national well-being and the world in which we live; and *Peripheral Interests*—which might lead us to act because our values demand it, but which do not have a substantial impact on us.

How does Latin America fit into this scheme? The first thing that must be said is that in a hemisphere that is increasingly integrated and interdependent, the growth and prosperity of the Latin America economies will profoundly affect the prosperity of the United States. The Latin American and Caribbean nations have already become the United States' fastest growing export market, with exports in 1998 expected to exceed those going to the European Union.³ By 2010, indeed, overall U.S. trade with the region is projected to exceed that with Europe and Japan combined. Some of this, at least, is of strategic importance. Venezuela alone provides as much oil to the United States as do all of the Persian Gulf states together.⁴ The continued provision of Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum, as well as access to the major new oil reserves of Colombia, constitutes an important—and arguably vital—U.S. interest which directly affects national well-being.

A second major interest is the promotion of democracy. At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral concern. For much of its history, the United States was perfectly comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, so long as they did not threaten higher priority interests like regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But that is no longer the case. U.S. values have changed; democracy has

been elevated to the status of an "important" interest. In part, this has been because American leaders have gained a greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a source of political stability. Governments that are popularly elected and respect human rights and the rule of law are less dangerous to both their citizens and their neighbors. Nations which are substantively democratic tend not to go to war with one another. They are also less vulnerable to the threat of internal war provoked, in part, by government violence and illegality.⁵

In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply value preferences, but are increasingly bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example: The restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mercosur have contributed in no small degree to their decisions to forego the development of nuclear weapons. Perceptions of threat have declined, and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progress on a range of security issues from border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternarcotics, and the combat of organized crime.

This leads us to those interests which are most commonly defined as "vital"—i.e., the need to prevent or contain direct threats to the "survival, safety, and vitality of our nation," including the "physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being, and the protection of our critical infrastructure."⁶ The most obvious threat of this kind would arise from the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by a hostile government or terrorist organization. The closest this hemisphere has come to such a scenario was during the Cuban Missile Crisis, though more recently there was concern about the spread of such weapons to the Southern Cone. That danger has been at least temporarily alleviated, however, with the result that the short- to medium-term threat from national governments is

virtually nil. In military terms, the United States today is the undisputed hegemonic power in the hemisphere.

The situation with regard to subnational and transnational entities is considerably less sanguine. The principal security concerns in the hemisphere today are transnational in nature, stemming from such activities as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism.⁷ Of these, narcotrafficking probably poses the most serious danger. Illicit drugs account for roughly 14,000 U.S. deaths every year, and cost American society an estimated \$110 billion.⁸ The mafias have spread corruption and violence in numerous Latin American and Caribbean countries, subverting national institutions, endangering political stability, and making a mockery of the notion of sovereignty. The outlook for the future is at best uncertain.

Finally, the United States also has humanitarian and other concerns, including the need to respond to natural and manmade disasters, the preservation of human rights, demining, the promotion of sustainable development, and support for democratization and civilian control of the military.⁹ While some of these interests may be peripheral, others are based on more than just ideological or humanitarian values. Some have security implications that might place them in a higher priority of interests. Human rights violations, for instance, did much to fuel the Central American conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. And so did failed or corrupted attempts at disaster relief, such as the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan governments' responses to the earthquakes of 1972 and 1976. In this sense, then, the international response to the recent devastation of Honduras and Nicaragua by Hurricane Mitch should be considered not simply a humanitarian effort, but an effort to preserve political stability in a region that has only recently emerged from civil war.

The Current Latin America Security Environment: Threats and Challenges.

What are the major threats confronting Latin America, how do they affect U.S. security interests, and how is this configuration likely to change over the next quarter century? Currently, there are several concerns. One of the most important is the danger posed by economic instability. By late 1998, the international financial crisis that had begun in Asia in 1997, and then moved on to devastate Russia in the summer of 1998, hit Latin America. Brazil seemed to be teetering on the brink of disaster. Capital flight was depleting its reserves, raising questions about the country's ability to pay its short-term debt.¹⁰ As the eighth largest economy in the world, Brazil accounts for about half of the output of Latin America, a region which buys roughly a fifth of U.S. exports. If the Brazilian economy went into a deep and prolonged recession, the spillover into other countries might trigger social and political turmoil that could endanger the region's young and still fragile democracies. Similarly, the impact on the U.S. banking system and economy would be substantial. More than 450 of the Fortune 500 companies do business in Brazil, which receives more direct foreign investment from the United States than any other country except China.¹¹ Fears about the country's economic health were already affecting the U.S. stock market.

With this in mind, in November 1998 the Clinton administration and the International Monetary Fund announced a "precautionary" \$41.5 billion aid package as part of a new strategy to help countries reform their economies before they were overwhelmed by the tumultuous global market forces that were sweeping the international system. Subsequently, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso persuaded a reluctant Congress to reduce social security benefits, a move foreign officials and investors viewed as a litmus test of the government's willingness to put the country's economic house in order. In January, the government announced it would allow the real

to float on the global markets, resulting in a 40 percent plunge in its value. At that point, the country was rapidly plunging into a recession, and the only question seemed to be how deep and prolonged it would be, and how much impact it will have on other Latin American countries.¹²

As of June 1999, the situation has improved considerably. As early as April, Brazil made a triumphant return to the international capital markets. From near-record lows in the first turbulent days of the crisis, the stock market rose by over 50 percent, more than recovering its losses. Meanwhile, interest rates fell, and investment began flooding back into the country. Foreign reserves grew rapidly, inflation eased. While the central bank continued to buy and sell currency in the foreign exchange market to help stabilize the real, the objective now was no longer to prop it up but to prevent it from becoming too strong. Thus had "the sleepless nights of January" given way to a resurgence of optimism. Talk of a Brazilian "contagion" all but vanished. The only major downside was the continuing impact of the crisis on the Brazilian people, who still had to bear the burden of the austerity that had been imposed on them.¹³

What is striking about this episode is not just how quickly the crisis disappeared, but the continuing fragility and volatility of the Brazilian and Latin American economies. Clearly, economic analysts and investors had overestimated and overreacted to the initial signs of trouble. But just as clearly, they were also overly optimistic about the future. The bottom line is that the region's economies remain highly vulnerable to foreign shocks, whether from financial crises half way around the world or a decision of the U.S. Federal Reserve to raise the discount rate. Just how vulnerable became evident in May when investor euphoria turned to panic, following hints of a coming rise in U.S. interest rates.¹⁴

A second major concern is the growing turmoil in the northwest quadrant of South America, especially in Colombia.¹⁵ There the armed forces have been steadily

losing ground to the estimated 20,000 Marxist guerrillas of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The rebels effectively control large chunks of rural Colombia. Over the past 2 years, they have inflicted a number of significant military defeats on government forces. They are well-armed as a result of the war chest they have accumulated through drug taxes, kidnappings, and a wide range of business investments. Nor are these the only combatants. The most rapidly growing violent groups in the country today are right-wing paramilitary organizations which are waging a holy war against the guerrillas, often in tacit alliance with the Colombian Army. There are now several thousand of these combatants. They are increasingly well-armed and organized, and are believed to be responsible for roughly 70 percent of the political killings in the country today. While the government is nowhere near collapse, the momentum is clearly in favor of the guerrillas and paramilitaries. The danger is that Colombia will become increasingly balkanized and divided among regional warlords, and that the violence will spill over the borders into neighboring countries. This process has already begun, especially in the Venezuelan and Panamanian borderlands, and it may be expected to get worse.

Closely related to these threats is the scourge of narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption have always been a problem in Colombia, as has the weakness of the state—its inability to command an effective presence—in rural areas. But the narcorevolution of the 1980s served as a catalyst for worsening these afflictions by channeling new resources (both financial and military) to old foes and creating new social actors, which transformed a polarized armed conflict between two sides (the armed forces and the guerrillas) into one in which multiple groups and sectors are armed. Nor are the paramilitaries and the guerrillas the only groups with ties to the narcos. The latter have penetrated all branches of government, from the national level to the local. While the case of Ernesto Samper (in which the former president

accepted drug money for his presidential campaign) may be the most notorious instance, it should not obscure the fact that scores of congressmen have also accepted drug money in return for providing political protection for the mafias. Similarly, countless judges have not prosecuted narcos because of bribery or intimidation. Nor have military officers been exempt from such temptations, or civil society, for that matter. The Colombian economy is far more dependent on narcotrafficking than, for instance, Mexico, and in the process of circulation, it taints virtually all social sectors.

In short, Colombia is an incipient narcostate. If the traffickers cannot control the political system, they have nevertheless had a profound influence. Even the destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels has not diminished their empire, for, in the aftermath, the industry decentralized into smaller mafias which, in turn, have shifted much of the coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia. Today, Colombia has surpassed those countries to become the largest producer of raw coca in the world. Some 80 percent of the world's cocaine comes from within its borders. Needless to say, there has been no diminution of the flow of Colombian drugs (including marijuana and, increasingly, heroin) into the United States. All of which suggests that, while mafias and mafiosos may come and go, the basic problem has not been unresolved. Nor is it likely to be, at least not within the foreseeable future.

Venezuela also is entering perilous waters. It is increasingly unstable. The past couple of decades have witnessed severe socioeconomic decline and widespread corruption, which have decimated living standards¹⁶ and undermined the legitimacy of the traditional political parties and the democratic system. The election in December of retired Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez as the next president of Venezuela was a reflection of that discontent. Chavez is a populist demagogue, whose allegiance to democracy is suspect. In 1992, he launched a bloody but unsuccessful *golpe de estado* against the

government. Among other things, he has promised to dissolve Congress and replace it with a Constitutional Assembly which would rewrite Venezuela's charter. Many fear that he will use his broad support to assume near-dictatorial powers, curtailing freedom of expression, and essentially eliminating the democratic two-party system that has prevailed since 1958. At the same time, he has also suggested that he will stop payments of Venezuela's foreign debt and reverse key privatization initiatives in the petroleum industry.

What Chavez will actually do, of course, remains to be seen. Some observers have raised questions about the quality of his radicalism. He has not been above saying different things to different audiences, and his pronouncements have become more moderate as he has moved closer to power. Moreover, as president he will have to operate within considerable constraints, not the least of which are the economic and political pressures the United States and the international community can bring to bear on him to avoid radical economic measures and the breakdown of democracy. This being said, however, his election has alarmed not only Venezuela's traditional political and economic elites, but elites throughout the region. It has been a wake-up call that long-festered problems of poverty, inequality, and corruption can no longer be ignored, lest the populace revolt and replace current leadership with a new generation of *caudillos* (strongmen), modelled perhaps along the lines of Chavez and his Peruvian counterpart, Alberto Fujimori, both of whom came to power through democratic means. At the same time, there is a fear, not simply of a return to the statist and protectionist policies of the past, but of the spread of the economic chaos and political instability they would probably engender.

How all this might affect U.S. access to Venezuelan oil is not clear, but it is worth noting that we have a considerable stake in that pot. Venezuela is currently our leading foreign supplier of petroleum, and unstable Colombia next door

ranks fifth. Whether a deterioration of U.S. relations with the Chavez government would endanger that access is difficult to say. This is not the 1960s, and Chavez does not have the option of turning to the Soviet Union as an alternative market in the event of a breakdown of relations with the United States. Indeed, given the current low international demand for oil Chavez might well think twice about alienating his best customer.

But as important as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are to U.S. security interests, they pale beside Mexico. Few countries are more vital to the well-being of the United States than its neighbor to the south. Not only is Mexico our second largest trading partner, but the two countries share a 2,000-mile boundary. Any serious political or economic turmoil below the Rio Grande River is almost certain to spill over the border in the form of illegal immigrants, political refugees, narcotrafficking, violence, or corruption.

U.S. national security interests in Mexico are based on several concerns, the most important being (1) narcopolitics and drug trafficking, (2) political instability and violence, (3) insurgency, and (4) economic crisis.

Of these threats, the first is the most pressing. The decade of the 1990s has witnessed an unprecedented growth and proliferation of major drug mafias. These syndicates have amassed huge fortunes, bought political protection at all levels of government, and engaged in internecine warfare against each other and anyone else unlucky enough to get in their way. In the process, they have so penetrated the Mexican state and socioeconomic structure that they have effectively subverted the country's institutions and undermined national sovereignty. You name the institution, and it has to one extent or another been corrupted: Congress, the courts, state governors, the banks, businesses, the military, the police. The Federal Judicial Police have been so corrupted that it is no longer possible to make clear-cut distinctions between them and the criminals they are supposed to apprehend. In Mexico, the police very

often are the crooks, and they have been deeply involved in narcotrafficking. Even the presidency has been touched, at least indirectly. There have been numerous reports of former cabinet members and other high officials with mafia connections. A former member of President Zedillo's and ex-President Salinas' security detail has admitted having been an operative for the Tijuana Mafia. Salinas' brother, Raul, probably had ties with the Gulf of Mexico cartel, and possibly with the Tijuana cartel as well.¹⁷

The ultimate danger, of course, is that Mexico might develop into a full-fledged narcostate. Already some 50-60 percent of the cocaine, up to 80 percent of the marijuana and 20-30 percent of the heroin imported into the United States comes from or through Mexico.¹⁸ In addition, the Mexican mafias have dominated the methamphetamine "revolution" of the 1990s. These drugs are poisoning American society, destroying the social fabric, spreading crime and violence, and costing the American taxpayers billions of dollars in loss of productivity and costs of hospitalizing and maintaining "coca babies" and children.

The syndicates operate deep inside the United States, and there is mounting evidence of their corrupting effects on U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, and other socioeconomic and political structures. Even the U.S. military has been affected, as is evidenced by the several dozen servicemen investigated in recent years for drug running.¹⁹ Should narcotics-related violence in Mexico escalate, moreover, the United States will not be immune. It will spread over the border. Indeed, it already has.²⁰

Another danger, which seemed on the verge of realization during the traumatic year of 1994, is that Mexico might become "ungovernable."²¹ This might occur in various forms and degrees, the worst case being a descent into anarchy or civil war. One possibility, for instance, might result from an intensification of the political struggles between the governing Party of Revolutionary Institutions

(PRI) and the opposition Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) and National Action Party (PAN). The PRI has lost a lot of ground in recent years. It no longer exercises the kind of dominance it did in the early 1990s, when Mario Vargas Llosa described Mexico as "the perfect dictatorship."²² Today, it no longer controls the Mexico City government or the Chamber of Deputies. Six governorships are in the hands of the opposition. It is not at all unthinkable that an opposition candidate might win the presidency in the 2000 elections. As the struggle for power intensifies, it could turn nasty. Moreover, the situation is complicated by an internal power struggle within the PRI. While the modernizing technocratic elements have been able to capture the presidency during the last three national elections, imposing a reform agenda that has included the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a substantial transition towards democracy, the Old Guard party bosses or "dinosaurs" are attempting a comeback. They blame the *tecnicos* for the erosion of the PRI's political hegemony, and want to turn back the clock. The stakes are high, and the possibilities of violence cannot be dismissed. (Some observers, indeed, still believe that the 1994 assassinations of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and PRI secretary general Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu were the product of such conflicts.)²³

Even if Mexico is able to avoid major intra-elite and partisan violence, there remain serious doubts about Mexico's future. If the PRI loses power, what will replace it? The opposition is deeply divided between the leftist PRD and the rightist PAN. Can these very different tendencies cooperate with one another to effectively govern the country? One could conceive a situation, for instance, in which the PRD's Cuauhtemoc Cardenas wins the presidency, but then is stifled in his efforts to govern by a conservative PRI-PAN coalition. The ensuing political conflicts and immobilism could frighten foreign investors, damage the economy, and aggravate an already difficult socioeconomic situation.

Still another danger is the spread and intensification of the insurgencies that have cropped up in Chiapas and other (mostly southern) states during the past half-decade. The socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to these movements have not been eliminated, and in some respects have grown worse. Moreover, human rights violations by the military, local authorities, and paramilitary groups often linked to them have added to the volatility of the situation. While it is difficult to conceive of current conditions developing into the kind of massive revolutionary violence that swept the country early this century, things could certainly get worse. Another economic crisis would undoubtedly fuel the discontent. If at the same time Mexico experienced an upsurge of conflict from other sources (factional strife within the PRI, violence aimed at the political opposition, mafia-related killings, common crime), this combination of factors could potentially lead to a situation of ungovernability. Under such circumstances, the government might be tempted to return to more authoritarian methods to maintain order. Though unlikely, a military coup "to save the patria" is not unthinkable. Nor is the rise of a civilian strongman, perhaps backed by the armed forces.

Finally, there is the uncertain course of the Mexican economy. For over 2 decades, the country has been on a rollercoaster ride of boom-bust cycles. In the process, hopes and expectations for a better future have been repeatedly raised, only to be dashed on the shoals of neoliberal reforms and unstable capital flows. There is no particular reason to think that the pattern will end soon. Though the Zedillo administration has done all the things the International Financial Institutions wanted, the growing interdependence of the world economic system means that economic shocks on the other side of the earth can have a traumatic effect on Latin America. Not until international mechanisms are created capable of preventing, or at least minimizing such "contagion," will Mexico, or anyone else, be really secure.

Nor can one be confident about the internal factors that can lead to crisis. Political instability and violence could still increase in the years ahead. Growing socioeconomic inequalities and poverty (which have been worsened by neoliberal reforms) could trigger popular unrest. New governments could come into office less committed to neoliberal programs, or even pledging to turn back reforms already made. Such developments could spark capital flight and thrust the economy into a downward spiral. One indicator to watch is how the economy behaves as the 2000 elections approach. Ever since the mid-1970s, Mexico has suffered from a syndrome in which the economy has been subjected to disruption or decline as each administration has drawn to a close. Will Zedillo be able to escape the "curse of the Mexican presidents"? Will his successors?

Pitfalls and Prospects of the Future.

And what of U.S. national security interests and objectives in the hemisphere 20 years from now? In general terms, they will be pretty much what they are today. The United States will seek to shape a stable, peaceful regional security environment; it will try to foster American prosperity through expanding trade and regional economic growth; and it will in all likelihood continue to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Thus, many of the challenges we will face will reflect current problems.

One of the most obvious needs between then and now will be the creation of mechanisms to maintain the stability of the emerging new international economic system. As Jose Antonio Ocampo has noted, the world faces a systemic crisis associated with the "enormous asymmetry existing between an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic international financial world and the absence of a suitable institutional framework to regulate this." While in the short run the answer is expansionist policies in the industrial economies, there is a long-term need for far-reaching reform of the international financial establishment, increasing Latin America's capacity to handle financial volatility with its

own fiscal, financial, and exchange instruments.²⁴ If this is not done, the consequence is likely to be chronic economic instability. Economic crises would become more frequent, along with the social and political turmoil that they engender. The implications for personal security, political stability, and democracy would not be salutary.²⁵

But even if international economic stability can be established, one cannot be confident about the prospects of stability. The neoliberal model of economic development has not yet proven it can generate an equitable distribution of wealth. Thus far, indeed, it has had a polarizing impact, increasing the gaps between rich and poor. Whether this is a short-term phenomenon, which will be reversed once economic stability is attained and the benefits of growth “trickle down” to the masses, or whether the inequalities and poverty generated will prove intractable cannot be predicted with confidence. Should the latter be the case, however, it will make the task of maintaining political legitimacy and stability that much more difficult. As Cynthia McClintock has noted, formal democracy is not enough. Unless people believe that a political system provides tangible benefits—e.g., improved living conditions, law and order, respect for human rights—they may withhold their support or cast it to demagogues or guerrilla groups who promise “real” democracy or a more fully “developed” democracy, or who reject liberal democracy altogether in favor of *caudillo* rule or some form of “totalitarian democracy.”²⁶

And let there be no mistake, there will be an abundance of societal and political weaknesses for such leaders to exploit. Unless rural areas can be rejuvenated and made economically viable for their inhabitants, problems of landlessness and land poverty will continue to provide the raw materials for insurgency and urban migration. At the same time, continuing rapid urban population growth, with all the attendant problems of decapitalization, corruption, unemployment, violent crime, and poverty, will create conditions fostering “ungovernability,” including terrorism,

insurgency, and an enhanced role for the military in internal security. The upshot will be continuing large-scale migration to the United States, which will serve as an escape valve to avoid social explosion, and quite possibly a return to less democratic forms of governance.

One must place this within the context of the region's history. In the past, Latin American countries have gone through cycles of democracy and dictatorship. While a wholesale authoritarian restoration could conceivably occur again, a more plausible scenario would be a limited reversion, with the pendulum swinging only part-way back. Thus, most countries would remain more-or-less democratic, with some developing more substantive democracy, others combining democratic form with authoritarian substance, and a few perhaps reverting to outright dictatorship. Needless to say, authoritarian restorations would be most likely where democratically elected governments lose legitimacy because of a failure to meet popular expectations.²⁷

Conclusion.

The preceding analysis, it must be emphasized, is more in the realm of speculation about *potential* problems than a prediction of the future. Latin America is a huge and enormously complex region, and the farther into the distance one attempts to extrapolate from current trends and realities, the less accurate the forecast is likely to be. Yet, even if one takes a more optimistic view of the future than I am inclined to do,²⁸ the previous pages should provide ample warning against complaisance. The next quarter century is as likely to be marked by political turmoil, violence, poverty, and inequality as by democratization and socioeconomic development.

It is especially important that this be recognized because U.S. attention to Latin America has historically ebbed and flowed. Unless there is a crisis, we tend to take the region for granted. Economic ties may be an exception,

but even here our attitude is ambivalent, as witnessed by Congress' unwillingness to grant the Clinton administration "fast-track" authority for an extension of NAFTA to Chile. Benign neglect is our preferred posture. As Scotty Reston once observed, Americans will do anything for Latin Americans except read about them.

The problem is that what happens in Latin America matters. Regional stability deeply affects U.S. national interests and security, and, unless the United States remains engaged, it is likely to find itself unprepared for crises when they arise. And they *will* arise. If we have learned anything from history, it is that bad times always return.

ENDNOTES

1. See, e.g., Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder*, London: Frank Cass, 1998.

2. President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998, p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

4. Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, before the 105th Congress, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, March 5, 1998, p. 2.

5. See Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310.

6. Clinton, p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

8. Barry R. McCaffrey, "A Strategy for Confronting the Nation's Drug Problem," *San Diego Tribune*, August 2, 1998.

9. Clinton, p. 6.

10. Michael M. Weinstein, "Economic Scene," *New York Times*, October 29, 1998.

11. Anthony Faiola, "\$1 Billion Flows Out of Brazil," *New York Times*, January 15, 1999; and "Unpredictable Congress Key to Brazilian Reform," *New York Times*, January 20, 1999.

12. On the Brazilian crisis, see Kenneth Maxwell, "Brazil in Meltdown," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 25-33.

13. Larry Rohter, "There's a Lot of Grit in Brazil," *New York Times*, April 23, 1999.

14. "Euphoria Wanes as Old Fears Return," *Latin American Weekly Report*, June 1, 1999.

15. The following is based primarily on Gabriel Marcella and Donald E. Schulz, *Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 5, 1999.

16. Between 1977 and 1993, per capita Gross National Income fell from U.S.\$3,310 to U.S.\$2,600. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *World Bank Tables 1995*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995, pp. 8-9.

17. For details, see Donald E. Schulz, "Narcopolitics in Mexico," draft manuscript, January 1999.

18. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, 1996-1998.

19. H.G. Reza, "Drug Probes Find Smugglers in the Military," *Los Angeles Times*, December 13, 1998.

20. See, e.g., the testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A. Constantine before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee's National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, February 25, 1997, pp. 10-11; and Howard LaFranchi, "U.S. Awakes to Drug Violence Spilling North From Mexico," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1997.

21. See, especially, Donald E. Schulz, "Mexico in Crisis," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn 1995, pp. 224-268.

22. Vargas Llosa stated:

The perfect dictatorship is not communism, not the Soviet Union, not Cuba, but Mexico, because it is a camouflaged dictatorship. It may not seem to be a dictatorship, but it has all the characteristics of dictatorship: the perpetuation, not of one person, but of an irremovable party, a party that allows sufficient space for criticism, provided such criticism serves to maintain the appearance of a democratic party, but which suppresses by all means, including the worst, whatever criticism may threaten its perpetuation in power.

Proceso, No. 723, September 10, 1990, p. 53.

23. Such arguments are highly speculative. Neither case has been satisfactorily resolved. Though Raul Salinas was recently convicted of masterminding the Ruiz Massieu killing, most of the evidence was circumstantial or hearsay. Nor is his alleged motive entirely clear.

24. "Impact of Crisis 'Greater Than Expected,'" *Latin American Weekly Report*, December 8, 1998, p. 570. On these issues, see Jose Antonio Ocampo, *Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Consensus and Divergence*, at www.eclac.org.cl.

25. For a detailed analysis, see William Greider, *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.

26. See Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, pp. 93-155, especially p. 155. On the notion of "totalitarian democracy," see J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.

27. For a detailed and insightful analysis of the weaknesses of Latin American democracy, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Consensus Found, Consensus Lost: Disjunctures in U.S. Policy Toward Latin America at the Turn of the Century," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, especially pp. 15-20.

28. See, e.g., the INSS's *Strategic Assessment 1998*; and Scott B. MacDonald and Georges A. Fauriol, *Fast Forward: Latin America on the Edge of the 21st Century*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997.

THE THREE TEMPTATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA

Peter Hakim

I would like to discuss the three temptations of Latin America. The basic challenges confronting Latin American nations are to achieve stable and sustained economic development; to build strong representative democracies; to reduce pervasive poverty and inequality; and to forge more productive hemispheric cooperation (both among the countries of the region and with the United States and Canada).

For most of this century, these challenges have remained out of reach because Latin American governments have failed, time and again, to resist three temptations—authoritarian politics, populist economics, and anti-Americanism. Yielding to these temptations has led to squandered opportunities for decent, democratic government and sustained economic advance.

It is easy to demonstrate how regularly nations have fallen victim to these temptations. The arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in London during the past year, for example, reminds us how much of Latin America's recent history has been dominated by authoritarian politics. In the years that Pinochet took and consolidated political power, dictators ruled in eight of ten South American countries and five of six Central American republics. Not all of these authoritarian regimes were run by military officers. Some dictators, like Somoza and Stroessner, were traditional *caudillos* or political strongmen. One—Fidel Castro—was a revolutionary leader. Other authoritarian regimes were headed by elected leaders, most notably in Mexico, which

Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa called, with perhaps some exaggeration, the “perfect dictatorship.”

Latin America’s authoritarian regimes were rarely, if ever, the consequence of a single power hungry individual, nor were they the work of a small cabal of conspirators. Only a very few were the work of the armed forces acting on their own. In nearly every case, for a variety of reasons, large sectors of the population (sometimes a large majority) supported the rise of authoritarian rule and allowed dictators to assume and keep power. Dictatorships mostly resulted from nations—not individuals or groups—succumbing to the temptation of authoritarian politics.

Populism has also been a pervasive presence in Latin America over the years. Its effects have been insidious in virtually every country in which it was introduced. Populist economic policies invariably led to high rates of inflation, and sometimes hyperinflation. Indeed, for many years, they made Latin America the world champion of inflation. Populism also resulted in the destruction of national currencies, huge—and sometimes unpayable—government debts, shrinking exports, hemorrhaging foreign exchange, and often severe shortages of essential goods, including fuel and foodstuffs.

All this happened in Chile during the 3-year presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-73). It also happened in Peru, during that country’s 5 years of Alan Garcia’s government (1985-90). Under Garcia, hyperinflation and national recession caused government expenditures to shrink radically—by as much as 80 percent, according to some analysts—a downsizing far more dramatic and brutal than that of any market-oriented government in the region.

The authoritarian temptation has often emerged in the wake of an economy devastated by populism. This is what happened in Chile, when Pinochet replaced Allende, and ended democratic rule in the country for 17 years. But populism has not been a sin of civilian governments only. Generals Velasco in Peru and Vargas in Brazil combined

authoritarian politics with populist economics, leaving both democratic institutions and their economies impoverished.

It is important to be clear, however. Not all governments that spend large amounts on social services are populist. A series of Costa Rican and Uruguayan governments vastly expanded social spending, but did so without bankrupting the economy—and, instead, improved the lives of most citizens. Chile today, which pursues the most disciplined economic policy in all of Latin America, also spends more than almost every other country on education, health, and other social programs.

Anti-Americanism is the third temptation. It, too, has long played an important role in Latin American politics. Latin American objections to and distaste for U.S. policies and actions have often been justified. Time and again the United States has intervened in a heavy-handed, and often callous fashion to promote its political or economic interests. The degree of U.S. influence has been exaggerated, no doubt—and Latin Americans have often downplayed or ignored constructive U.S. initiatives.

Whatever the cause—justified or not—anti-Americanism was a pervasive phenomenon in Latin America for many years. And it clearly and frequently blocked cooperation between the United States and the region. Anti-Americanism was an undercurrent that struck a responsive chord among many people in most countries. Latin American leaders could often not resist the temptation to use that chord when they wanted to shore up their popularity or explain away an embarrassing failure. Politicians of the right and the left, particularly, regularly whipped up anti-American feeling to win elections.

There have been some dramatic changes. Over the past 20 years, Latin America appears to have forged a growing resistance to the three temptations. Country after country has turned to democratic politics and free-market economics, and is actively seeking political and economic cooperation with the United States.

In some respects, Latin America's transformation is as dramatic and remarkable as the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe. Some have called Latin America's evolution the slow motion equivalent of the toppling of the Berlin Wall.

In the 1960s and 1970s, elected leaders governed only two of 10 South American countries. Today, every country on the mainland of Latin America is ruled by an elected president. In Mexico, opposition parties are now the majority in the lower house of Congress, and next year stand a good chance of capturing the presidency. Perhaps the most striking fact is that, since 1976, only one elected president in all of Latin America and the Caribbean has been forced out of office by a military coup. And Haitian President Aristide was subsequently restored to power 3 years after his removal. Several other attempts were made to assume power illegally, but these all failed. There have been no coups in any Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking country in nearly a generation—a remarkable achievement in a region that had been notorious for its instability and frequent constitutional interruptions.

The shift to market-oriented economic systems has been equally dramatic. Since the mid-1980s, virtually every country in Latin America, to a greater or lesser degree, has sold off state-owned enterprises, struggled get its fiscal house in order, opened its economy to foreign trade and investment, and brought inflation under control. In the early 1990s, annual inflation for Latin America as a whole was pushing toward triple digits. Today, the region's inflation rate, on average, is only about 12 percent, and no country has a rate in excess of 100 percent.

It is hard to believe that the most widely cited catalogue and progress report on economic reform efforts in Latin America—the Washington Consensus—was published nearly 10 years ago. Economic reform is now more than a decade old in nearly all of the region's major countries. Today, in most countries, market reforms are not only

considered the best way to promote sound economic performance and rapid growth; they are also seen as the path to political office. With few exceptions, almost every presidential election in the past half a dozen years in Latin America has been won by the candidate promising to sustain economic reforms; in many elections, both candidates have promised to do so. Good economics have become smart politics as well.

Anti-Americanism has also lost its seductive power in Latin America. Carlos Andrés Pérez said in 1976 that Latin America had never had good relations with the United States. The statement appealed to me at the time—and I used it in an article some 15 years later in 1991, when I wrote that Pérez would not make that statement today. The article—“US and Latin America: Good Neighbors Again?”—discussed the important range of Latin American policy initiatives undertaken by President Bush and his advisors. These included the Brady debt relief plan, which signaled the end of the Latin American debt crisis; the settlement of the Contra war in Nicaragua; the start of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations; and President Bush’s declaration that the United States would seek free trade arrangements with every country in the hemisphere through the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

There is no shortage of disagreements between the United States and Latin America—but automatic anti-Americanism has virtually disappeared from the region. Anti-Americanism does not win elections any more. On the contrary, most Latin American nations want closer, more cooperative relations with the United States in every sphere. This was evident at the two Summits of the Americas, which brought together the hemisphere’s heads of state, first in Miami in 1994 and again 3 years later in Santiago, Chile. Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso recently stated that Brazil and the United States have never had better relations, and that is the situation for many other Latin American countries, as well.

However, there are some open questions. Although no longer yielding to destructive temptations, most Latin American countries have not yet made much progress in resolving their long-standing problems of slow and unstable economic growth, poverty, and social exclusion, and poorly performing national institutions. Throughout the region, remarkable changes have taken place in economic management and political practice, but these have not yet produced the results that had been promised and expected.

Plainly, Latin America's economies are not expanding fast enough. Over the past 10 years, from 1990 to 1999, economic growth will average, for the region as a whole, less than 3 percent per year or about 1.5 percent per capita. This is better than the 1980s, the lost decade of the debt crisis, when the economies of Latin America grew by an annual average of only 1.1 percent, and income per capita declined almost everywhere. But growth still falls far short of what is needed for a sustained attack on poverty. Indeed, in this decade, only a handful of Latin American countries will achieve the 4 to 5 percent expansion that the World Bank suggests is needed for any meaningful improvement in social conditions.

Latin America has enjoyed some good years in the 1990s, but each time that the region seemed headed toward a period of sustained growth, it has confronted a new crisis. The Mexico peso collapse in 1995, and global turmoil this year and last provoked economic slumps throughout Latin America. The economies of Central America—particularly Nicaragua and Honduras—were devastated by Hurricane Mitch. The combination of slow growth and high volatility is particularly ruinous for poor families. Their low incomes, modest assets, and unstable employment leave them unprotected against either natural or man-made disasters.

Continuing boom and bust cycles are one of the main causes of the extreme inequality that pervades Latin America, which is the most unequal region in the world. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the

top 5 percent of income earners in Latin America walk away with one-quarter of the national product, while the bottom third obtain only 9 percent. In comparison, the top 5 percent in East Asia receive 15 percent of national income, while 12 percent goes to the bottom 30 percent. This is an enormous difference.

One central question is whether Latin America can effectively manage its economies in our globalized world. Can it take good advantage of the immense availability of investment capital, while avoiding the dangers that rapid capital movements can produce—turbulence, volatility, and financial shocks? Can it take advantage of the increasingly open trading rules of the world economy by exporting more and upgrading the quality of its exports? Or will the countries of the region find themselves overwhelmed by cheaper and higher quality imports?

Most of the region's financial officials and political leaders are betting that Latin America can be globally competitive. They are organizing their economies and shaping their policies to make that happen, and they have accomplished a great deal. Inflation has been brought under control, large numbers of industries have been privatized, most countries are effectively strengthening their banking systems, high quality economic management is commonplace, and regional economic integration is underway, although moving at times in fits and starts. These are encouraging advances, but they have not yet produced the expected improvements in economic growth and stability.

Turning to politics, it is clear that, in most countries, the most important institutions of democracy are just not working very well—that is, aside from the electoral process. In nearly every country of the region, elections are considered free and fair; the results are rarely contested. Other critical democratic institutions—legislatures, court systems, political parties, and trade unions—are limping badly. Parliaments, for the most part, are feeble, subservient either to the president or to regional and local

interests. In most countries, judicial systems are barely competent and fundamentally unjust; in some they are cruel and corrupt. In many places, political parties no longer command much respect or credibility; in some, like Venezuela and Peru, they have virtually fallen apart. Freedom of the press has been a bright spot, but the media still operates under restrictions in many countries.

Moreover, with few exceptions, Latin America's democratically elected governments are not doing a very good job of governing. Such public goods and services as law and order, quality education, health care, clean streets, and adequate water supply are simply not available to a large share of Latin America's population. Throughout Latin America, cities are crumbling, and school and health systems have deteriorated in the past several years. Traffic and pollution, along with skyrocketing crime, threaten the quality of life and welfare of citizens everywhere in the region.

Despite these difficulties, the danger now seems slight that Latin American countries will once again succumb to the kind of military or authoritarian rule that was once so common in the region. To be sure, there are reasons for concern about the election of former military dictator Hugo Banzer as President of Bolivia and that of coup leader Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela. The continuing popularity of autocratic generals Lino Oviedo in Paraguay and Ríos Montt in Guatemala is also worrying, as is the concentration of power in Peru and the outsized political influence of the country's security forces.

But Latin America and the world have changed too much for a return to authoritarian rule. Democratic elections have been the only way to obtain power in Latin America for nearly a generation. Civilians no longer think of the military as the final arbiter of political disputes—and both civilian and military leaders are aware of the high costs that financial markets impose on economies rent by political disruption. Sure, in one or another country, the armed

forces may decide to force a civilian government from office. We are, however, unlikely ever to see the military rule for long stretches as they did in the recent past.

What remains of the authoritarian temptation is likely, instead, to provoke democratically elected leaders, perhaps like Chávez, to take the route of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru—to assume more power than they are constitutionally allowed, perhaps with the help of the armed forces. We are not, however, likely to see massive, prolonged interruptions of democratic processes. The main question now is one of the quality, effectiveness, and inclusiveness of democracy and democratic institutions—and the answers so far are not reassuring.

Anti-Americanism—the final temptation—is hard to uncover these days in Latin America, at least not in the virulent form that was once common. It is noteworthy that not a single electoral campaign in the past several years has been grounded on anti-U.S. rhetoric. The leaders of Latin America, instead, are seeking cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade and investment. The issue is whether this improved political situation can be turned to the mutual advantage of both Latin America and the United States. Experience over the past several years has been disappointing. Expectations had been rising that U.S.-Latin American relations would be closer and more productive, anchored in hemisphere-wide free trade arrangements. These have, however, been frustrated—most importantly by the failure of the United States to secure fast track negotiating authority, but also by a declining commitment to steady trade liberalization in major Latin American countries.

The opportunities for hemispheric partnership are clearly fading and need to be renewed. Whether this will occur anytime soon is, at best, uncertain. Among the key questions that remain open are:

- Can the nations of the hemisphere succeed in their negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, now scheduled to be completed in 2005?

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- Can the United States and Latin America agree on how to reform and increase the effectiveness of the Organization of American States and other inter-American institutions?
 - Is the United States ready to refrain from its long-standing tendency to resort to unilateral action when it cannot get its way through cooperative initiative?
 - Is the United States able and willing to take a leadership role in hemispheric integration efforts? Is there sufficient agreement on the future shape of hemispheric integration among the United States and other major countries like Brazil and Mexico to make progress possible? Between the larger nations and the smaller states of Central America and the Caribbean?

Thank you.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

Terry L. McCoy

Thank you very much. I would like to thank the organizers of this event for the opportunity to speak here. I follow economic developments and economic policy in Latin America. The news on that front is not good. We have been accustomed to really pretty good news from Latin America during the 1990s—the Central America peace accords, the democratic transition that has occurred throughout the region, economic reform and economic growth, and the regional integration process. These are developments that began under the Bush administration. And now there are questions about sustaining them. I would like to refer particularly in the economic area because I think the news there is troubling, even worrisome.

Thus far, Latin America has avoided the much feared economic melt-down, an Asian-like scenario in which Brazil would have to do a maxi devaluation, and the rest of the hemisphere would follow into a major economic crisis—not unlike that of the 1980s—which would reverse everything that has happened in terms of economic progress this decade. But there is clearly an economic slowdown occurring in Latin America. Growth rates are going to be down this year and next. In some countries there will be negative growth. And not just any countries—Brazil, in all probability, will experience a recession. Brazil generates 40 percent of regional gross product of Latin America.

Other important countries that have been accustomed to high growth rates will have low growth rates. The Chilean growth rate will probably be a third of what it has been over the last several years, if that. Even Argentina, which seems

to be somewhat immune from the economic slowdown, is going to have a difficult time, not only in 1998, but also 1999.

Other economic indicators are equally discouraging. Fiscal deficits are really out of control in some countries, up to 8 percent in Brazil; 7 percent in Chile, which is also very surprising; and there are very large current account deficits because of the problems in the balance of trade.

These are the kinds of problems that presumably Latin America had resolved by adopting tough-minded economic reforms. The first piece of the Washington consensus was to impose macroeconomic stability. And it appeared as the 1990s wound down as though that had been accomplished. But this is not the case.

The slowdown and uncertainty of late 1998 come on top of a reexamination of the accomplishments of economic reforms adopted throughout Latin America in the 1990s. Observers are questioning whether the reforms have lived up to expectations. To begin with, growth rates are not very good—by historical standards in Latin America, in terms of the task that needs to be accomplished, nor by world standards either. So that is the first thing that is disturbing. But even more disturbing is that the economic reforms of the 1980s have not significantly diminished the widespread poverty in the hemisphere nor the extremes of income inequality.

Now, what are the roots of the economic downturn? The most obvious one is the Asian financial crisis which began in October 1997. It has impacted Latin America through volatility in short-term capital flows, the so-called emerging markets contagion. It has had an impact through declining demand for Latin America exports to Asia and in terms of declining commodity prices. These are the vectors through which this crisis has been transmitted to the doorstep of Latin America.

And the fear is, of course, that the Asian crisis would spill over in full force into Latin America and create the so-called

melt-down, which has thus far not happened. This is what the Brazilian bail-out plan is all about, and why Brazil is so important.

I think there are other roots to Latin America's economic vulnerability. There is the whole question of the incomplete nature of the democratic consolidation in Latin America—the lack of viable institutions of government and politics that is now affecting the policy process, the inability to maintain coherent policies, and to implement those policies across-the-board. Not only must a president decree that his country is going to have a certain exchange rate policy, but the other institutions in the government—the legislature, and particularly the judicial branch—must implement this policy. And we are seeing now that those kinds of institutional weaknesses are affecting the economic policies and performances of the region.

This convergence of the economic crisis from Asia and the incomplete nature of political reform in Latin America is a dangerous situation. It produces the possibility of a political backlash, that is, a breakdown of the consensus that has supported economic reform in Latin America and possible retreat on policies opening the region to integration in the new global economy. I think it is even more probable that it will create uncertainty and drift over the next 2 years. And I think we can see this in places which are surprising, such as Chile and Argentina.

The Mexican case is interesting because of the election. The first freely-contested election in Mexican history in a long time comes up in 2000, precisely at a time that Mexico is struggling with a whole series of very deep economic policy issues.

And I think a final element of the economic downturn is the disengagement of the United States from Latin America over the last several years; since the Miami Summit in December 1994, to be precise. The tip of the iceberg is the inability of the president to get "fast track" authority from Congress. This is important not only because of the

difficulty negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement without it, but it is also important symbolically. It is a statement that the United States is incapable of, or uninterested in maintaining engagement with the rest of the hemisphere.

Thank you.

A NEW VISION OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

Ambler H. Moss, Jr.

Thank you very much. I notice the Congressman did not bring along his red, orange, and green committee lights to keep me on time, but I have my watch here, and I am going to try to hold it to about 10 minutes so we can get on with the interactive phase.

Dr. Hermann, General Cisneros, I really appreciate the opportunity to be with you today and also appreciate the fact that you have invited such a strong Florida delegation to Texas. That is certainly a first.

Let me recall another first, since we are at The Bush School. It has already been referred to this morning but needs saying again. In the minds of many of us Latin Americanists of all stripes, the new era in U.S.-Latin American relations in many ways began with President George Bush's speech, "The Enterprise for the Americas," in June 1990. I remember it very well. It had an overwhelming positive reaction in Latin America.

That speech was the first any post-World War II American president has given with the East-West overlay clearly lifted off of the North-South context. The Cold War was over. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative speech was the first post-Cold War speech which really enunciated a new vision of U.S.-Latin America relations. It was based on three pillars: a free trade area from the top to the bottom of the hemisphere; relief from the debt problem; and new investment in a free market economic structure. With that, of course, inherently went the promotion of democracy. That was a bold new vision which really set the tone; so much so

that even in his campaign before his election, President William Clinton reaffirmed President Bush's commitment to free trade. Later he picked up the torch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), brought up the free trade as the centerpiece of the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994, and has continued, despite the unfortunate loss of fast track. I still feel, however, that the United States, as a country, is fully engaged in the free trade process and the summit process. Sooner or later, it will get its act together and have fast track. In the meantime, however, in the nine negotiating groups set up under the summit process, it is going forward, and looking ahead to the year 2005 as the culmination of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

I want to get to some very specific ways in which I think the U.S. military can be helpful in the promotion of democracy. Don Schulz offered an outline that is very complete and with which I thoroughly agree.

But let me first mention that what we heard this morning was a mixture of optimism and pessimism. There are a lot of optimists that look at Latin American democracy as something here to stay; yet a lot of pessimists say there are so many things besieging it, how can it survive? I think Peter Hakim combines a marvelous combination of optimism and pessimism in the same person and characterizes much of our ambivalence about the way things are going.

I brought with me a book that North-South Center has recently published not just because I am here to sell books—I am actually going to leave copies of them for General Cisneros and Dr. Hermann—but I just wanted to call attention to the title, *The Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*. Post-transition means the transition to democracy. I am sure Ambassador Negroponte and I, who came into the foreign service practically at the same time, more years ago than we are going to admit, never thought that in our lifetime we would ever see 34 freely

elected heads of state sitting around the same table. I have to admit that I was actually in the U.S. Delegation to the 1967 Summit in Punta del Este, and it was not that way then. But the world was different in 1994, and it has stayed different, and we hope it continues that way.

Nonetheless, of course, as we heard this morning, democracy is under siege not because there is a lack of electoral commitment to it, but, as is pointed out this morning and we have to keep in mind, because military establishments in Latin America are part of society. When you see the weakness of democratic institutions and of the infrastructures supporting that electoral democracy, persistent and worsening inequality during the 1990s, poverty on the increase, inequality between rich and poor growing along with unemployment, economic growth which has slowed down to below what the former World Bank chief economist Sebastian Edwards calls the minimum level of 3.6 percent economic growth needed simply to retain Latin America where it is keeping up with the population growth rate—all of these are a mixed picture, constituting many, many different fault lines of democracy.

The good news, however, is that although the Free Trade Area of the Americas has not expressed democracy in such explicit words as the Treaty of Rome did for Europe, the FTAA has become a democratic club. It is written between the lines, even in the lines practically, that to remain a member of that club and to participate fully in the FTAA, countries are expected to stay under democratic governance.

The pattern, of course, is, is mixed. In my view, civil-military relations have not made the full transition that electoral democracy has. If you look at several examples, you will find that the relationship is mixed in different countries. Encouragingly, one country, Argentina, where the military were most dominant and in which anti-Americanism was very strong, has made perhaps the most complete transition to civilian governance of any of the

major countries of Latin America. This is extraordinary, especially when you think that since 1943, up until the end of the Malvinas or Falklands War in 1986, its politics were dominated by the military. That has disappeared along with anti-Americanism. I go to Argentina quite a lot. Anti-Americanism has subsided to the point where it has practically vanished. The Argentine military have taken on the new and idealistic mission of peacekeeping. They are one of the leading peacekeeping forces in the world today, along with the Canadians. They now teach it to others in an academy in Buenos Aires.

In Brazil, there is a great public acceptance of military involvement in fighting street crime, and that perhaps is one limitation to the military's retirement from civilian life. Certainly, in all countries, elected governments have reduced the influence of armed forces in nonmilitary areas. However, some commentators talk about the need for governments to avoid the temptation to give the military a routine role in issues of internal public security that really belongs within competent civilian police organizations. Often this happens by default. In many countries, the police organizations are inadequate to handle street crime. That is why the military moves in. They are not pushing the door to get in. They probably do not even want to be there. But unless civilian institutions and police organizations can be strengthened, that is simply what is going to happen.

In some other countries, of course, the civil-military transition is less complete. In another southern cone country, Chile, the situation is less resolved than in Argentina. There the military still have substantial political and economic prerogatives. When they left power, General Pinochet remained as head of the Army, and they voted themselves immunity from crimes against the civilian population.

The Chilean military still has a considerable oversight capacity in its national security council. There are limitations on the civilian government to appoint and

dismiss military chiefs, and there are restrictions on the power of government to control the military budget. For example, 10 percent of all the profits from the state copper company, CODELCO, which has not been and probably will not be privatized, go directly to the military.

Now, let me move on, because I promised we would be very quick and get on to the interactive part of this. Let me continue by building on and maybe adding a couple of thoughts on what the U.S. military can do. I am privileged to live in a place where I am a close neighbor of General Sanchez, General Wilhelm, and the people of SOUTHCOM. They do a magnificent job in all of this, in promoting democratic values and helping institutions in the hurricane relief cleanup and making sure that other units that are not permanently assigned to Latin America, such as the numerous National Guard units and reserve units that go down to Latin America, can play a helpful role. This is a tremendous resource.

Most of the people that go down into Honduras in the areas affected by the hurricane come from National Guard units. These people bring tremendous expertise because they are, most of the time, civilians who have a lot of skills and technology that could be transferred, as well as their positive attitudes.

I would say everywhere, and this is certainly true of what General Wesley Clark is doing in Europe right now, the person-to-person contact between the U.S. military and Latin American military, in this case, can do what our Army in Europe is doing right down the the whole swath of Eastern Europe, everywhere from Estonia to Albania. The missions are very much the same, and the message is the same: Encourage armies to adopt an affordable size, something that makes sense in their own national security context; promote—and this needs reiterating all over again—the idea of civilian control; adopt a rational budgeting system; decentralize decision-making.

A point which Dr. Schulz brought up so clearly is training civilians to take an interest and become experts in national security matters. It has been, again by default, that the military moved into these areas because there were no civilians that knew or cared about it. Now they can and are getting involved. Teaching democracy and human rights in U.S. military schools is another important area.

I have been privileged for the last few years to be on the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Army School of the Americas under the dedicated, visionary leadership of General Hartzog as Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). I can report to you that I am ready to stand up any day and debate anybody that says that the School of the Americas should be closed. People are essentially fighting the history books, going back to some other era in which they allege that the School promoted dictatorship, torture, and the violation of human rights, which it never did. I would roundly debate those critics of the school. But I would say that is totally irrelevant. What is relevant is what the school teaches now, and I know it very well. I have been to Fort Benning a number of times. Part of the routine of the Board of Visitors is to be in a classroom full of the students without any of the instructors. And the last time I met with a group, mostly Peruvians and a few people from several other countries, I said, "All right. What are you learning in this school?" What do they come up with right off the bat? Human rights, and not simply limited to the rules of engagement but the whole conceptual basis of what human rights are really all about. I was very impressed at what this school had gotten across. I think a school has to be judged for what it is teaching currently, how much impact it has currently. I am absolutely satisfied that the School of the Americas is doing a splendid job in promoting democracy and human rights.

I would urge the Army and any interested civilians, particularly members of Congress, to take an active stance in not only defending the School of the Americas when it is attacked, but actually promoting it as an ideal vehicle.

For my money, military officers—and I used to be one—foreign military officers tend to pay more attention to U.S. military officers than they do to civilians from their own country. Certainly they are not going to pay any attention to “gringo” civilians, however well-intentioned, on these subjects.

So, I think the school ought to be maintained and promoted. TRADOC runs the school, but the Southern Command is its major client. It is a marvelous institution that teaches in Spanish, unlike all the other fine Army schools where you have to learn English to attend them. But I think that kind of experience repeated across the band of military schools that we have is an absolutely wonderful vehicle for promoting democracy.

Thank you.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS

Donald E. Schulz

I've been asked to say a few words about the role of the U.S. Army in promoting democracy in the Americas or, to use the phrase employed in the letter of invitation that I received to this conference—What role, if any, can the U.S. Army play in encouraging the development of democratic institutions in the Americas?

A certain amount of skepticism is understandable. We are accustomed to think of the Army in a less constructive role in Latin America. We have a long history of intervention in the region. And Latin Americans, at least, tend to think of the U.S. military more in those terms than as a force for political stability and democracy.

But times have changed. The Cold War is over and so are the days when the United States was willing to embrace any repressive dictatorship simply because it was able to maintain political stability and prevent communism from coming to power.

Today, the promotion of democracy is a priority item in the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the hemisphere. And the U.S. Army, as an instrument of that policy, is being employed to help further that cause. How? In what ways is the Army promoting democracy in Latin America?

Well, one way is by encouraging Latin American military officers to envision their profession in a manner that fosters democratic civil-military relations. Here, education and training are critical. A military doctrine must be developed that emphasizes the proper role of the armed

forces in a democratic system. And I'm not talking merely about respecting democratic elections or refraining from launching *golpes de estado*, but about a willingness to obey civilian authorities and respect human rights and civil liberties.

Democracy is not a one-dimensional phenomenon, however. It is entirely possible to have a situation where you have honest elections and yet the quality of that democracy is seriously undermined by violations of human rights. Honduras, in the early 1980s, quickly comes to mind, or perhaps Mexico today. And so there is a need to educate Latin American military officers in democratic civil-military relations and in the value of human rights.

This training must be explicit, substantive, and ongoing. It is not a one-shot proposition. Going through the motions is not enough. You cannot just bring Latin American officers to the United States under the assumption that a simple exposure to U.S. society or to U.S. military professionalism will foster democratic values. Osmosis does not work. We are talking about the transformation of highly authoritarian military cultures and the creation of new patterns of democratic civil-military relations. That is not an easy thing. It never is. It will take more than one generation to transform the Latin American military culture. We will find that in the process there will be some military cultures that will be much more difficult to transform than others.

At the same time, education and training cannot be limited to the military. It is equally important to educate civilians. One of the greatest impediments to the development of democratic civil-military relations today remains a lack of competence and interest in national defense and national security issues on the part of civilian authorities.

This is perhaps not surprising. In the past, national security issues were dominated by the armed forces. Latin American civilians had very little role in these matters; and so, consequently, they had very little interest in or

understanding of them. And so it is not surprising again, even when you had civilian ministers of defense, they tended to be figureheads. Real power remained with the military commanders.

Today, this has begun to change. When last I looked, there were something like 20 civilian ministers of defense in Latin America, some of whom are exercising substantial authority. This being said, however, civilian control of the military still has a long way to go. And, in part, I would argue, this is because of a lack of civilian competence—basic competence—in national security matters.

One cannot expect military professionals to respect civilian leaders unless those leaders are also competent professionals. Without that, there will always be a certain distrust and, indeed, contempt undermining the relationship and, consequently, a temptation to resist civilian control, to ignore official policies, and perhaps even resort to *golpes de estado* whenever civilian leaders are perceived as endangering national security through their incompetence and irresponsibility.

Thus it is important to educate civilian leaders in national security issues; issues like defense management, and military strategy, roles, and missions. And not only political leaders, there is also a need for a greater understanding and involvement of civil society in academia, in the private sector, and elsewhere.

It was with this need for civilian education in mind that the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies was recently founded at the National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. Similarly, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have been very active in sponsoring conferences and seminars, such as last year's Sante Fe conference on "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas," and this year's Buenos Aires conference, designed to bring together civilians and military from both Latin America and the United States to explore these critical issues.

I should note that many Latin American militaries have established programs and institutions of their own to bring together civilians and military officers in courses on national security issues. The U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have played an important role in fostering and funding these kinds of activities.

In sum, these programs, I believe, are steps in the right direction. I think it would be a tremendous mistake for the U.S. military to keep its Latin American counterparts at arm's length. It would be sending precisely the wrong message, namely, that we do not care how they behave, and that there would be no cost involved in returning to traditional practices of political intervention and human rights abuse. Latin Americans need armed forces that are more professional and more committed to working within a democratic system, not less. And here the U.S. Army has an important role to play as a teacher, mentor, and role model.

Now this being said, I think it also has to be emphasized that this is not an easy road that we are embarked upon. There is a danger, I believe, in modernizing and professionalizing the military without a comparable strengthening of the capacity of civilians to provide competent leadership. To strengthen the military without strengthening civilian institutions and civilian leadership can weaken democratic civil-military relations by making the civilians more dependent on the military and tempting the latter to intervene or assume a dominant role behind the scenes.

There are other ways also in which the U.S. Army supports democracy. The provision of humanitarian assistance in the wake of Hurricane Mitch, for instance, was not merely done out of the goodness of our hearts. This was not just humanitarian aid; it was also stability assistance.

One need only look back to the 1970s and the disastrous earthquakes in Nicaragua and Guatemala to appreciate the destabilizing impact that such events can have on these small and vulnerable societies. The inability of the

Nicaraguan and Guatemalan governments to deal with these humanitarian crises and the incredible corruption that attended their efforts at relief and reconstruction had the effect of delegitimizing those governments and gave impetus to the guerrilla movements that flourished in the years that followed. By the same token, the inability of the Honduran and Nicaraguan governments today to cope with the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch could have potentially similar consequences.

Democracy rests on legitimacy. And the weakening or destruction of that foundation will imperil these nations and their still very fragile democratic systems. And so it is very much in the U.S. interest to provide disaster relief and help reconstruct these countries. Here the U.S. military, with its transport and medical and engineering capabilities, is providing a critical support to political stability and democracy in Central America. And it is doing similar things, I might add, in Haiti, where you have a Military Support Group engaged in engineering and medical aid, critical socioeconomic functions that the government of Haiti cannot provide its citizens.

It should not be overlooked that the U.S. Army has played a significant role in democracy restoration campaigns in recent years. Here I would simply cite the examples of Panama and Haiti. By the same token, it can even be argued that U.S. involvement in Central America in the 1980s helped bring democracy to countries like El Salvador and Honduras.

Now, this is something nobody likes to talk about, because military intervention is no longer fashionable, it is no longer politically acceptable. Even with the best of intentions, it cannot but stir memories of the old days, when the United States intervened in Latin America at the drop of a hat, for reasons that often had very little to do with the promotion of democracy. Largely for this reason, and the fear of triggering an anti-U.S. reaction and because there is so little domestic political support in the United States for

military intervention, most actions of this kind are likely to be options of last resort that are undertaken only when all else fails. Or when they are undertaken, they are likely to be multilateral rather than unilateral in nature, for instance, under the auspices of the United Nations.

I must point out that this is a very tricky area. Even in Haiti, it can be argued that U.S. intervention was prompted less by a desire to restore democracy than by other considerations. And that, in turn, suggests one of the pitfalls of the future. There may be circumstances somewhere down the line where the United States may once again be tempted to intervene, and that the defense of democracy may serve as a legitimizing pretext for that intervention.

And on that comforting thought, I will turn the podium over to the next person.

**THE ROLE OF LAND FORCES
IN DRUG INTERDICTION:
THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN A PRAGMATIC
STRUGGLE**

John D. Negroponte

Good afternoon, everybody.

I thought, both in the interest of time and also I sensed this morning that there were a few occasions when we did not get to everybody's questions and did not have a chance to discuss some of the issues as thoroughly as we might have wanted to, that perhaps brevity is what is called for at the moment, and hopefully we can have a good discussion afterwards.

I thought Peter Hakim's discussion this morning of key trends was really important in setting the stage for our meeting today. Just to recapitulate some of the points he made, but also to add a thought of my own with respect to major global trends, let me mention a couple of the ideas that he discussed. One was, of course, the trend toward democratization, and that is not only a Latin American trend, it is a worldwide one. The globalization of the world's economies is obviously another key trend. I would put the empowerment of individuals as certainly an important global trend that's every bit as applicable to Latin America as it is to other parts of the world. The internet, modern technology, educational opportunities, all of these things, I think, are working to empower individual citizens around the world much more than they used to.

I think another important trend we have got to talk about in the context of our meetings here today is the significant reduction of defense budgets around the world.

We are not talking about the kind of defense budgets that existed during the Cold War. One of the most staggering set of numbers to look at is the information about the size of the current Russian economy, not the Russian defense budget, the Russian economy, which is something on the order of 400 or \$500 billion. And when you think that at the height of our defense expenditures during the Reagan administration, we had a \$300 billion defense budget. That was probably, in the terms of the dollars at that time, not that different than the size of the whole Russian economy today. So you have got to think about that and what the implications are in terms of reduced spending for military activities and operations around the world.

Another point I would like to make, just in terms of the political changes we were talking about in the second panel this morning, is crucial and that is that political change has come principally from within the various countries around the world which have experienced that trend towards democracy. It has not been because we were there as the agent for the change. Surely, we played a role in encouraging it, and we certainly applauded it when it happened. But let's not forget that the principal stimulus for the political change towards democratization, whether it was in Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Union or in Latin America, came from within these countries themselves. And if you look at the dates when they occurred, these pressures for change and this movement towards democratization started before the end of the Cold War. Perhaps it was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, but it started earlier and was attributable to a whole number of factors.

Now, against this very hasty background and with the benefit of all the discussion that occurred this morning, what is the best role for the military in such matters as drug enforcement? I would like to submit, first of all, that there really are some philosophical problems with unduly involving the military in such matters as counternarcotics.

First of all, I would raise the issue of whether it really is or should be a core competence of the military, whether we're talking about the military in the United States or the military in other countries. I have in mind the questions of what is the mission of the military, and do counternarcotics activities really fit within that mandate?

The second issue I would raise on a philosophical plane is whether or not the involvement of the military in counternarcotics activity, however justified by the immediacy of a specific situation, runs the risk corrupting the military institution and, as a result, exacerbating the situation. I think there are a number of countries that we can cite as examples of this problem or at least where the question has arisen.

Panama, I think, would be a good one, where, in fact, ultimately the Panamanian Defense Force became basically a racketeering organization rather than an institution that was fighting narcotics trafficking.

Clearly, in Mexico, that's a philosophical issue that has been raised in the past and, I suspect, continues to be raised today. I certainly remember in my conversations with the Mexican Minister of Defense that he had grave apprehensions about involving the Mexican military in the counternarcotics struggle, other than the rather limited role of destroying marijuana crops.

You will remember that the Mexican Army had the mission of going out about 25,000 strong every year during the appropriate times to destroy the marijuana crops. But other than that, they had an extremely limited role. And that, of course, has changed since that time.

But perhaps the most important philosophical operation, to my way of thinking is, does entrusting the military with a counternarcotics role delay the development of a genuinely effective law enforcement institution? Say you involve the military in your counternarcotics activity. Does that become a pretext for the body politic of that

particular society to delay, postpone, and otherwise disregard what I think is the really difficult problem, which is to develop an effective law enforcement institution in a country concerned? So let's go back to the fundamental question: What is the most appropriate role?

I guess at the risk of seeming a little bit imprecise, I would just say the appropriate role for the military is to do the minimum necessary. On the other hand, one has to recognize the practicalities of certain situations. That brings us now from the philosophical to the pragmatic. And it seems to me that there are certain types of practical situations which call for the limited utilization of military forces in the counternarcotics struggle. Clearly, one of them is in situations where the traffickers are using blatantly military means. I mean, how can you argue that if the traffickers are basically a military force, that we cannot use military force to counter them? You have to fight fire with fire. I suppose in today's context, perhaps, the country of Colombia would perhaps be one of the best examples.

Another one would be to deal with specific issues that are beyond the capability of law enforcement agencies. I'm thinking particularly of air and sea detection and surveillance. When you are talking about a narcotics problem that extends well beyond the national borders of any given country, but which is nonetheless a vital component of the situation, such as illicit flights or illicit vessel traffic that are carrying drugs, it seems to me there is a very good case that can be made and has been made for using air and naval assets for detection and surveillance.

And certainly during my time in Mexico, from 1989-93, I think we saw some very successful applications of that model. We set up a so-called Northern Border Response mechanism within the country of Mexico, that depended heavily on intelligence information that came on a real-time basis from our air and naval assets that were working in and over international waters and air space.

But still, even under these circumstances, I think there must be constraints. I do not think that counternarcotics should be the core military mission. I think that such missions as are undertaken should be viewed as temporary or transitional.

Now, when we're talking about the use of our armed forces in the 21st century, you might ask, "Well, how long is temporary or transitional?" I don't know; several years; 10 years. But I don't see that kind of a mission necessarily being something that military forces should be undertaking well into the next century.

Another point I would make is that, to the extent possible, that interdiction should be as close to the source as possible.

I recall when these flights that we were tracking would come into Mexico, if you did not catch them where they landed, forget it. Once they had gotten onto the ground and were able to unload their cargo to trucks, taxis, whatever other conveyance they used to then move up north and get the narcotics across our land border, you were really looking for a needle in a haystack. I think whatever activities we undertake should be undertaken in the context of strong funding for the development of law enforcement agencies and building up their capabilities to the maximum extent possible.

Finally, let me suggest that, as we try to draw some conclusions in this discussion, we be careful not to forget the overall policy context in which we are operating. I do not think that we can talk in terms of our assisting the Latin American military, supporting or assisting them in the counternarcotics struggle in isolation from overall policies.

I think that President Bush, in mentioning the Free Trade Initiative that occurred during his administration, the overall effort to develop a sense of community in this hemisphere, these are the key policy initiatives, it seems to me, that need to be encouraged. And a counternarcotic

strategy in and of itself is not a substitute for this broader policy context. And I would submit that if all you have is assisting Latin American military in combating drugs, and you neglect these other aspects, such as the free trade arrangement for the Americas, sooner or later that policy is bound to founder.

THE USE OF ARMED FORCES IN DRUG INTERDICTION: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Bruce M. Bagley

Good afternoon. I was invited here actually as a devil's advocate. I was told that someone had read a monograph that I wrote for the North-South Center called "Mis-militarization" and that I was expected to lay out the problems that are involved in the use of the military, both the U.S. and Latin American militaries. I come and I find this morning that Ambassador Negroponte and I agree on many of these central issues. So my rôle as devil's advocate need not be quite as intense as I thought it might be.

But let me lay out what I think are the basic missions that are involved with regard to the United States in the war on drugs, particularly in Latin America. I then want to move on to a second set of points regarding the limitations or the downside or the counterproductive aspects of the role of the U.S. and of Latin American militaries—some of which were mentioned by Ambassador Negroponte already. And then, finally, I would like to move to what other components are necessary beyond the role of the U.S. and the Latin American militaries to even begin to address the issues of drug trafficking and the national security problems that they represent.

Very quickly, I think that the inventory of principal missions for the U.S. military in the war on drugs in Latin America and, to some extent here at home, are four-fold. The first, and one that has been carried out, I think, with some considerable efficiency, is the support of the interdiction of illegal drug shipments from Latin America into the United States in the air, on the seas, and along our borders. And

that mission has now been carried out for a number of years—since President Reagan first declared this as a national security issue in 1985-86.

But I also want to point out at the start that, despite the increased involvement of the U.S. military and the use of our equipment, illegal shipments of drugs are more available in the United States, drugs are cheaper and easier to get in our country today than they were when we started this; and that anyone who thinks that interdiction, no matter how much we spend on it, is going to solve this problem, is fundamentally mistaken. It is not a strategy which can work, in any overall sense, to halt the flow of drugs from Latin America or other parts of the world into the United States.

I think there is a second major role that the U.S. military can play which has to do with planning and carrying out of intelligence operations and the sharing of that information both with Latin American militaries and with Latin American law enforcement agencies as well as our agencies here. The U.S. military is particularly well-equipped to carry out that mission.

One of the fundamental limitations has been our inability to share that information both within the agencies here in the United States and a variety of law enforcement and military establishments in Latin America. We need not go beyond the examples that Ambassador Negroponte has indicated.

I think there is a third mission for the U.S. military, which is the training of both military and law enforcement personnel in the strategies and tactics that the U.S. military uses and that it considers most appropriate in all this.

We have a serious problem here in using that training and making it adequate and inculcating it into the military establishments of a variety of Latin American countries whose priorities and whose missions are very much

different from the priorities and missions that we begin with here in the United States.

Finally, the U.S. military has the capacity to set an example for Latin American militaries throughout the region with regard to the proper subordination of the military to civilian leadership and the education and training of military establishments in the region on how one conducts a professional military operation.

That being said, I think that this fourth mission is one of the more important ones that the U.S. military has, and I was very happy to hear from a variety of speakers that it has become an increasingly important part of the way the U.S. military looks at its mission in Latin America.

As I move to the second set of points, I want to emphasize the problems and risks and counterproductive aspects. I want to begin with a statement which runs slightly counter to some of the optimistic statements about democracy that were made this morning.

In my opinion, one of the fundamental problems that the U.S. military confronts in dealing with drug trafficking in Latin America and in training and educating Latin American military and law enforcement institutions is the total absence of effective democracy in many of these countries. It is difficult to subordinate the military to a nonexistent or a corrupt or ineffective democratic leadership. Colombia has had major crises in its leadership under President Sampar. Mexico has for years been considered one of the more corrupt countries in the hemisphere. We need not talk about President Zedillo, but we could talk about President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his brother, Raul.

Given such examples, subordination to elected authorities rings a bit hollow in a variety of Latin American countries. And I think that is a fundamental problem that the U.S. military must confront in its dealings with Latin American militaries when we preach the subordination to

democratic authorities. These “democratically” elected authorities lack legitimacy in places where only formal democracy is adhered to—where corruption runs rampant.

If that kind of starting point is accepted, at least for some of the countries in the region, I think that we have very serious difficulty in implementing some of the very nice words that were said this morning about the subordination of Latin American militaries to democratic authorities throughout the region. We have what I think are called formal democracies. Everybody points to the fact that we have democratically elected governments, but we lack effective, responsible, and legitimate democracy in many parts of Latin America. Certainly in the Andean region, whether we are talking about Peru or Ecuador or Colombia or Venezuela, we should have serious concerns about how deeply democratic the commitments of the civilian leadership, in fact, are.

Moving on to a second point. I think that the U.S. military runs, as does the U.S. Government in general, some severe risks of distorting the precarious balance between military and civilian leadership in a variety of Latin American countries. First, inflated budgets created by U.S. aid for narcotics interdiction provide huge amounts of resources within the context of Latin America. Not within the context of our own country—but within the context of Latin America—military establishments there are very often only tenuously controlled by civilian leadership.

President Andres Pastrana went to Washington and came back with a package of \$289 million. Primarily, it was aid to be given to the military and the police—the national police in Colombia, which is subordinate to the military. Under these circumstances, that is a huge increase in the military budget and distorts balance and control, in my opinion—or at least has that potential. In countries like Ecuador or Peru or Bolivia, where national budgets are extremely limited, a few hundred million here and there add up to a lot of money in terms of political power for the

military. That is something I think we have to be extremely careful of. These are not necessarily decisions the U.S. military makes. But the U.S. military is often the instrument of implementation chosen by Washington, particularly in the current context, and one that definitely can introduce distorting effects in the balance between civil and military authorities.

I also think that there is a second problem. In some countries, it has become more obvious than others. I would call it, just to give a shorthand version, the establishment of back-channel communications between military groups—that is, communications between the U.S. military and military establishments in Latin America that either circumvent or only pay formal lip service to civilian control. The adoption of General Serrano, the police chief in Colombia, is one example of how the United States has elevated a particular individual, whom I think is quite respectable, without any question, but who has taken on a much larger-than-life role.

Finally, I think that there is a potential in this context of overemphasizing the military's role in halting the process of drug trafficking in Latin America over other priorities and increasing the potential for authoritarian arrangements to emerge. I do not mean military coups. I think military coups have largely been ruled out—both because of past experiences and because of the automatic nature of U.S. reaction to any military *golpe* in Latin America. I refer here more to the likelihood of Fujimori-style (President of Peru) relationships, in which the military and some civilian authorities basically shunt aside institutions such as the judiciary or the Congress or other parts of government, and effectively rule the country without any true democratic participation.

Ultimately, by distorting budgets, by establishing back channels, and by increasing the role of the military and its authority within these countries, unintended consequences

can be created that the United States and the U.S. military have to be extremely careful of.

I agree with Ambassador Negroponte that making Latin American militaries the *punta de lanza* (point of the spear) in the war on drugs in various Latin American countries runs the very high risk of exposing them extraordinarily to the corruptive and corrosive effects of drug trafficking. Mexico is the best example possible.

President Zedillo, in an act of desperation, brought the military into the war on drugs in Mexico. I am not sure what the count on generals is right now who are under arrest, or under indictment, but we are talking at least a half a dozen. In a variety of other Latin American countries, we have seen the same thing, and it runs right down through the entire command structure, interrupting the chain of command, distracting military establishments from some of their principal missions in these countries, and running the risk of corrupting yet another institution in very serious ways. That corruption will generate not just a couple of years of problems, but decades of problems in various Latin American countries.

I also think that it overshadows the need, as Ambassador Negroponte pointed out, of strengthening civilian law enforcement agencies and the administration of justice in a variety of these countries. We can talk about extradition of criminals, whether the Medellin or Cali cartels or some other cartel in Colombia or—the four major families in Mexico. We can talk about their extradition to the United States. But until countries in the region are able to administer justice effectively, deal with their own transnational criminal organizations and bring them to justice, imprison them and stop them from trafficking, we have not succeeded in what is the major task of this effort. To postpone that effort by throwing the military in on a short-term basis seems to me not only dangerous but ultimately counterproductive. It is the strengthening of civilian law enforcement and the administration of justice

in these countries which must be the ultimate goal if we are going to strengthen democracy throughout the region.

Finally, there are two points here that I think must be added in the counterproductive part. First, there is a problem in a country like Colombia, that bringing the military into the drug trafficking problem also brings the U.S. military increasingly into contact with the internal war within Colombia—that is, with the guerrilla war.

The argument from the Colombian military, and I think rightly so, has been that some elements of the *Forces Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), are increasingly active in drug trafficking. There is no question that they are. Nonetheless, the United States is finding it difficult to maintain a distinction between insurgency or guerrilla warfare on the one hand, and drug trafficking on the other. Colombia represents the ultimate nightmare—that is, the involvement of the United States in an internal war in a country in Latin America where there has been fighting for almost 40 years.

Finally, and most importantly, I think that the militarization of the drug war runs the risk of overshadowing the alternative policies that must be pursued if any drug control effort or drug war is going to be effective.

I want to quickly enumerate what I consider to be the central or key elements, more important than the role of the military itself. The first that I would emphasize is the whole issue of alternative development. This means not crop eradication, not fumigation, not spraying, not crop substitution, but a development strategy for those areas in Peru, in Colombia, and in parts of Mexico, for example, that have been engaged in drug trafficking for decades, and that have been largely abandoned by their countries over hundreds of years. We are not talking about something that is recent. We are talking about something that is been going on for centuries in several parts of Latin America.

In Colombia, many parts of the eastern plains have no roads now and have never been effectively connected with the central parts of the country. It is a question of development, and until that effort is undertaken, there will be groups of peasants out in these regions under the sway of the FARC that have no realistic alternative. To spray or to eradicate crops is to leave them with nothing and to create a recruitment program for the FARC—nothing else.

Under these circumstances, a serious alternative development program, which will cost billions—sometimes called the Mini-Marshall Plan by a variety of countries in the region—seems to me the *sine qua non* of any serious effort at drug control over the long term. That kind of economic commitment is probably not available; certainly not in the context of the economic downturn that we heard described this morning. But without development, we are going to be back here in 5 years talking about the role of land forces in the war on drugs one more time.

I think institution building, in the largest sense, is the second major priority. One where the military has some role, but where other, mainly civilian, agencies have critical roles. The Department of Justice, Agency for International Development (AID), the State Department to an extent, and other civilian agencies, all have critical roles in developing civilian law enforcement, justice systems, and congresses in many of these areas.

And, finally, given my lack of time, I would emphasize that, if we are going to develop a hemispheric commitment to a war on drugs, it has to be one in which the civilian leadership feels like a participant in a process of multilateral monitoring and certification, not a process of unilateral U.S. certification which stimulates or provokes nationalist reactions in a variety of countries.

Thank you.

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

William W. Hartzog

There is a great philosopher some of you might know named Gary McCord. He titled a book, "A Range Ball in a Box of Titlist." I know, this afternoon, what he was feeling when he wrote that.

I am a mechanic. I am not a student. I am not a philosopher or strategist or anything else about this issue. But I have spent 9 years in the business of Latin America and counternarcotics in a variety of places. I was the operations officer in JUST CAUSE, and I replaced a fellow named Marc Cisneros, whom some of you might know, as the Commander of our forces in Latin America after that. Over the rest of my military career, I have had the chance to provide forces to the border in the Task Force 6 area, and the Mexican border. I was one of the chief planners for the Haiti Operation. And I spent the last 4 years trying to project what the U.S. Army would be like in the future.

I would like to spend about 5 minutes—and I promise you I will make it as short as I can—trying to emphasize some things regarding counternarcotics operations that have not been discussed. I will try to do it at a lower level, a mechanical level, and to focus on what the Army might give to this kind of operation—this type of campaign. I am reluctant to use the word "war," because I think that is a poor word and not analogous to what we are trying to do at all.

I would like to end with a minute's worth of something we have not touched on today: to try to forecast the future; to look at what might be 10, 15 years from now in this arena; and to bring all of our minds to bear on what the land forces' role might be in a scenario that we can only dream about. So

you will need to suspend judgement a little bit and jump into the crystal ball with me.

I turned over command of the forces in Latin America in 1991. We had three huge problems. What if someone had asked me, "What is inhibiting our ability to make progress in counternarcotics operations from a U.S. perspective?" The military is not the lead, nor has ever been the lead, in this operation—we have been in a support role for the entire time. I would have told them three things. First, I would have said that we do not have a long-term commitment. We do not have a long-term view. Every plan I participated in writing; every plan, indeed, that I participated in executing, was 1, 2, or 3 years. This is not a 1-, 2-, or 3-year condition. Historically, it hasn't been, and likely won't be. The second thing I would have said is that it is not very well funded. At the time, I think we had something like 3 percent of the foreign military sales budget to spend in the region at all. That has been halved and almost eradicated since. Third, I would have said that we didn't have a way of measuring whether we are doing anything or not. We can pat ourselves on the back, we can look at prices, we can look at growing things, we can take pictures, we can use hectares, we can use numbers of deaths, we can use any number of things. But we had no consensus on whether or not we were making progress.

Since that time, we have established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). They have published a number of 10-year strategies. I think that the number of organizations within the United States that understand what those strategies are about, and the confluence of different agencies that participate in them, is growing.

The budget has increased. In 1981, for example, if you lumped all of the dollars from our budget together from all of our agencies that had anything to do with this problem, they totaled about a billion-and-a-half dollars. In 1998, if you used the same contributors, you will have about \$16 billion

involved in this. Is it enough? I do not know if it is enough or not. We will come back to that in a moment.

In the last several years, we have produced two different documents that try to get at orders of measurement—things that we might try, things that we can grade ourselves on, things to tell us whether or not we are making any progress. Are we winning, are we helping, or are we part of the problem, as some have alluded to today?

Well, before I talk about the land force, let us review quickly what the goals of the United States—not the military, not the land force, but the goals of the United States—are in drug control: Drug control—all drugs.

We say that we are going to educate our youth. That brings some ideas to mind. This is a generational problem. Is educating our youth once enough? The answer, obviously, is no. You might educate a youth, but you might not educate the son, grandson, or granddaughter of that same youth.

We include alcohol and tobacco in those things that we are going to call illicit drugs, at least in our policy. Is that right or not? I do not know, but it certainly stretches the horizon of what we are trying to cover. We are trying to reduce drug-related crime and drug-related violence. Is there a role for the military in that? Maybe. I will come back to that.

We are trying to reduce health and social costs. There is a tremendous correlation between drug use and ill health and drug use and crime and violence.

The two things that are most traditionally associated with land forces are shielding our borders, and doing those things outside our borders to assist our friends and our allied nations who have these problems—both in the growing and interdiction areas. These efforts attempt to eradicate or to diminish the supply. This is a supply *and* demand problem.

Now, when I found I was going to come here, I went to the very best folks that I could find in ONDCP and other places and had them produce for me all of the statistics because I wanted to tell you—"This is how we are doing." There are a lot of protestations and a lot of discussions. You might find these numbers I am about to give you nauseating. You might find them false. Alternatively, you might find them encouraging. I do not know.

Since 1979, the number of current users of illicit drugs in this country has declined from 25.4 million to 13.9 million, a 45 percent decline. Do you believe it? If you do, in the same time frame, our budget has gone from 1 1/2 billion to 16 1/2 billion dollars.

Second, the nation is moving away from cocaine. Current use of cocaine in the household population is down from a peak in 1985 of 5.7 million users to 1 1/2 million in 1997. At the same time, I would tell you marijuana use is increasing dramatically among the younger part of our population.

At the same time that these things have been traditionally our targets, as far as the United States is concerned, use rates are coming down. Overall, heroin, in a number of different forms, is on the rise. Methamphetamines are also on the rise. They are no longer emergent drugs. They are drugs that are with us, and with us in a very large way.

We have a strategy in our nation today. Our national priorities for how we are going to combat this and reduce supply is cocaine first, heroin second, methamphetamines third, and marijuana fourth. We have regional priorities about how we are going to help in the growing and interdiction areas. Colombia is the first priority, Mexico second, Peru and Bolivia, third and fourth.

We have Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that give us the reason for why we are doing this. And against that whole background, since 1989, and my personal experience, the military has had a role. It is a support role. We have statutory responsibilities. We have the lead in only

one thing—the detection and monitoring in the transit area of the shipment of drugs between production and our borders.

We also have a primary assist role in integrating command and control apparatus—moving information about targets back and forth. We make information available when our policies say that we can do that for our allied and partner countries.

We have the responsibility to approve and fund certain National Guard programs. And we have the responsibility to provide support on an as-needed basis to other U.S. agencies. Now, there are problems with all that, and I will get very pragmatic and very practical about it all.

We are not the lead agency. We respond to other agencies, and do it rather well. But we are not there at many of the endgames, because the endgame requires the ability to arrest. The military is not in that, has not been in it, and I would say to you, in my personal opinion, should not be involved in it. So we are in assistance to a lot of different agencies. What effect does that have on the readiness of units?

Well, you have to work hard to make the support to counternarcotics operations compatible with training for larger, hot wars. It is possible. It can be done. But it is difficult. And it is something that you have to put a lot of time and planning effort in to make it occur. Those things that I jotted down here that I have personal knowledge of and that I have been involved with during the last 10 years are things like running radars, training people how to run radars, monitoring movement of transit business. Mostly, host nation support. Mostly allied force-to-force mobile training teams and training missions. We have also provided intelligence to countries who needed it. At the same time, we have provided planning, logistical training, and manpower support to countries who needed it. We have conducted exchange programs with a number of training

institutions. And in the last job that I had, one of my 26 schools, proudly, was the School of the Americas.

We are also involved in the research, development, and acquisition of different kinds of hardware and technologies that you might use in working or eradicating the drug effort. So the role of the military is in the organizational, operational, and institutional modes.

Lastly, and here is where I am going to have you suspend judgement with me. There are two ways to think about the future, in my judgement. You stand rooted in the present, understand where you are, know the conditions around you, and move cautiously and reactively into a future that comes upon you. We talked this morning about threats that we were not in front of. There is another way to change and to move forward. That is with more courage, anticipate or walk mentally out into the future, and stand on a theoretical mountain top and describe what you think might be—and then look back to where you are today and pull yourself forward. I have always preferred to try to do that. So let us walk into the future and see where we might be 10, 15, 20 years from now in this business. I will paint some parameters here, because I am both optimistic and pessimistic, as many of us are.

I think it is a sure bet that illicit drugs and the use of illicit drugs are pandemic, they are worldwide. As far as I can see into the future, they will continue to be a broad societal problem. In my judgement, this is a generational problem. It is something that cannot be cured in a short time, or done once. It is something that requires, particularly on the demand side, continuing education throughout generations.

It seems to me that there is a trend in reduction in the use of chemical, biological, and natural agents; maybe an increase in the use of purely synthetic agents.

Now, you do not have to be a *Star Trek* reader to admire some of the things that are written in our science fiction. But

if you do read those sorts of things, you know that there are assumptions and assertions of many kinds of addictive sonic devices and other things that may not even fit the notions that we call illicit drugs today—things that we have not begun to dream about yet, synthetics.

Many of the cartels in the large drug trafficking organizations were things we all fought, understood, and plotted to work against in the early 1990s. They have fractured and broken into smaller mom-and-pop organizations. Maybe it is fair to say that we are headed toward a future in which there is a fragmented and ill-defined structure. Perhaps an analogy to “the Berlin Wall” coming down.

You can understand a diagram of families and organizations. You can target a company that runs airfields. But, if it is 16 different countries and different places run by folks who do not normally or culturally do that sort of work, you have a much more difficult case.

There seems to be a reduction in tobacco use in older age citizens, but an increase in younger age. What does that tell us? There are increases in alcohol use at all ages across-the-board. What does that tell us? What does our future landscape tell us?

We know that information is a burgeoning thing. The ability to move information bits—the digitization of our world. We can see things today, instantly, that took a week or two to see before. It took 8 to 10 hours to send a horse message of five kilometers in 1865, 1864, at Gettysburg. It took about 6 hours to send the same sort of message in World War II by telegraph. Today, we can all look at the same thing on the same screen at the same time. What do satellites have to do with overhead view and 2015 in the counter-narcotics business? We should not be afraid of technology; it is with us.

One of the things that I firmly believe is that we can spend all of the energy in doing support operations, and we

should do what we can afford, to help our allied countries deal with these problems. We can do it in the air, on land, and at sea. The land part of it is mostly, in my judgement, training, intelligence collection, analysis sharing and supporting, qualifications like linguistic training, and document exploitation. Those sorts of things that have long-term benefits. "Train the trainer" still comes to mind when I think about these things.

There are some technical breakthroughs that we have to commit ourselves to, both medically and otherwise. Maybe there is a chemical of some description that is the analog to Antabuse that will tell you it is a very lousy thing to use an illicit drug. I do not know. But those are things that we can work on.

I do not know if this is our future, but I do know that there is a role for the land force in it. It is not a straightforward one. It does impact on the readiness of forces to do other things. It has to be managed carefully and, in my judgement, it cannot be avoided.

THE USE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AMERICAS: AN OVERVIEW

Max G. Manwaring

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the global system and the verities that shaped nations' purposes, policies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. Old concepts of security are no longer completely relevant. In this connection, there are powerful internal and external organizations and individuals who argue that there is no longer any military requirement for armed forces in Latin America. Moreover, there is also a strong argument that military forces—indigenous and foreign—are the primary obstacle to democracy in the hemisphere. As a consequence, there is considerable pressure for the armed forces either to find new missions or to fold their tents and go away.

This anthology examines the related problems of security and civil-military relations within the context of the contemporary "new world disorder." Thus, while the danger from the destabilizing efforts of the Soviet Union and Cuba is no longer credible, it has been replaced by the less direct "nontraditional" threats emanating from narcotrafficking, organized crime, and corruption. To be sure, in the meantime, insurgencies in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru drag on; border problems—most notably between Ecuador and Peru, and between Brazil and those who would encroach on its Amazon territories—persist; and, finally, a struggle for the controversial resources of the territorial seas looms in the dim future as a very real national security issue for every country in South America except Paraguay. Nevertheless, the consensus is that the most potent and most immediate threats to national security and survival in

the Americas have got to be the threats resulting from the pervasive illegal drug industry.

In elaborating this thesis, this overview develops the argument that the security of Latin America and the rest of the global community will depend on international and domestic policies that provide for political stability, economic progress, and social justice. A corollary to this argument is that internal and external security also depends on a cooperative and constructive civil-military relationship. Within this context, this overview examines (1) the major political, economic, and social trends in Latin America; (2) strategic issues that relate to the use of land forces in the Americas; and (3) civil-military relations now and for the future. It draws from points made by the speakers at the conference.

Major Trends in the Americas.

The end of the Cold War brought significant improvements in U.S. relations with Latin America, and changes in the role of the armed forces and civil-military relations throughout the region. The so-called neo-liberal revolution gave democratically-elected civilian leaders new strength and eroded the influence of the military. It also generated a sea change in the economies of the hemisphere, moving from the command economies of a long authoritarian era to the free market economies of today. In this context, Latin America has enjoyed the fruits of the "new world order" to a much greater extent than most of the rest of the world. Yet, something of the "new world disorder" has also crept into this part of the global community.

Peter Hakim elaborates on these changes and cautions of the temptations associated with such immediate and profound political, economic, and social transformation. He identifies the key trends in Latin America as (1) the strengthening of democracy, (2) sustaining economic development, (3) overcoming the vast poverty and

inequality of the region, and (4) building cooperation in the Americas. In these terms, it is important to note that:

- There has been no coup in the hemisphere in almost a generation;
- Every country in the region has sold off many of its state-owned enterprises and has initiated the economic reforms necessary to get its fiscal house in order;
- The resultant economic growth, however, is still below what is needed to effectively address the task of reducing poverty and inequality; and,
- Anti-Americanism does not win elections anymore—most Latin American countries want closer, more cooperative relations with the United States. That is the good news.

The bad news is that the changes these trends in Latin America portend have not yet produced the results that could and should have been achieved. In this connection,

- Democratic institutions are not working very well, there are still enormous problems of governability, and there is still a serious question regarding reconciliation of the authoritarian misdeeds of the past and the resultant polarization of some societies.
- As noted above, the economies of the region are growing too slowly.
- Latin America remains the most socially unequal part of the world.
- The United States seems to be unable to use the current good relations to build a more genuine and enduring relationship in the hemisphere.

Terry McCoy is even less sanguine and points out that:

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- The whole question of the lack of viable political institutions is adversely affecting economic policy and progress.
 - There is an obvious economic slow-down taking place in Latin America that could easily result in a major recession.
 - Political and economic reforms have not affected, in a positive way, widespread poverty and income inequality.
 - Lack of U.S. commitment—most importantly in not promulgating Fast-Track negotiating authority—is not allowing the possibility of fulfilling its potential partnership in Latin America.

Thus, the trends toward democracy, free market economies, social equality, and viable partnership with the United States are not only trends. They are also challenges for now and the future. There is not only a challenge to better political, economic, social, and partnership performance, however. There is the additional challenge of overcoming temptations that Latin America, for the most part, has been historically unable to resist. These temptations involve:

- A reversion to authoritarian politics to allow a strong leader to solve difficult problems for the polity;
- A reversion to irresponsible populist economics to placate restless populations; and,
- A reversion to anti-Americanism to excuse embarrassing internal authoritarian failures.

Mr. Hakim reminds us that, “Yielding to these temptations over time has led to squandered opportunities for decent democratic government and sustained economic advance.” Clearly, no one should underestimate the

challenges ahead. What is being attempted in Latin America will require considerable effort in several different dimensions—political, economic, social, and diplomatic—simultaneously.

Strategic Issues that Relate to the Use of Land Forces in the Americas.

In the past, security on the U.S. southern flank was primarily associated with possible external traditional military threats concerning access to or denial of specific strategic raw materials, military bases and military support, vital maritime routes and choke points, and regional markets to actual or perceived enemies. When these were the things that mattered, the United States could ignore internal conditions within the hemisphere. If, however, what concerns the United States about its southern flank today is the capacity to buy U.S. products; reduce instability and continue the development of democratic and free market institutions; and to cooperate on shared problems like the environment, refugee flows, and illegal drug trafficking, the United States will continue to have an important—but more internal—national security stake in Latin America.

A corollary to this argument is that U.S. and Latin American security depends on a cooperative and constructive civil-military relationship. What is required, then, is a combined civil-military effort to apply the full human and physical resources of cooperating nations to generate the real well-being of an individual country and its political, economic, and geographic partners.

Dr. McCoy, Ambassador Moss, and Ambassador Negroponte strongly associate the current trends characterizing the political and economic transformation of Latin America with initiatives that began under the Bush administration. Ambassador Moss asserts that “The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” speech the President made 10 years ago “really enunciated a new

beginning for U.S.-Latin American relations. That was a bold new vision that set the tone not only for the Bush administration, but also for the Clinton administration.”

Former President George Bush, in his luncheon speech to the conference on December 15, 1998, explained that “there is no substitute for decisive U.S. leadership as a force for peace, a force for freedom in the world.” He went on to state that there are plenty of threats to peace and freedom, and that,

In Latin America threats come specifically in the form of the drug cartels and corruption. If left unchecked, these two cancers alone would corrode and ultimately destroy the fruits of hard-won reforms which have already done so much to provide stability and lift the standard of living for much of the hemisphere.

Bush further implied that in the post-Cold War era, the dominant threats to the Western Hemisphere, and the rest of the world, are manifested in nontraditional ways. The most acute national security challenges today are transnational and internal threats that emanate from nonstate actors and the corruption they engender.

If not confronted effectively (at the strategic as well as operational levels) they can corrode the very fabric of society and the fundamental institutions of law and order.

Ambassador Moss takes President Bush’s logic a step further and suggests that the Bush and Clinton initiatives for peace, freedom, and stability in Latin America require an integrated, holistic approach in which land forces can participate and contribute.

I think any kind of professional military endeavor, whether in medicine or law or engineering or anything else in which there is interchange, is assistance and it is also a transfer of technology. That is a positive inducement to the promotion of democracy, simply because it is building civilian infrastructure as well as building of civilian societies.

It is at this point where the question of the role of land forces—and particularly the U.S. Army—in encouraging the development of democratic political, economic, social, and military institutions in the Americas comes into clearer focus. Donald E. Schulz outlines three ways the U.S. military acts as a force for democracy and stability.

First, the U.S. Army is encouraging Latin American officers to envision their profession in a manner that fosters democratic and constructive civil-military relations, and values human rights. The key enablers are the exercise programs and the military-to-military programs conducted by the armed forces of the United States. Second, Schulz argues that education and training cannot be limited to the military. It is also important to develop civilian competence—basic competence—in national security matters to preclude the perception that civilians may endanger the national security as a result of their incompetence and irresponsibility. Continuing education conducted by the U.S. armed forces is helping Latin American countries keep from falling victim to the three temptations that were described by Peter Hakim. Finally, the provision of humanitarian assistance—as in the case of the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch—is not merely humanitarian assistance. It is also stability assistance. Thus, the U.S. military has an important role to play as “a teacher, mentor, and role model.”

Ambassador Negroponte agrees that armed forces can make a contribution to overall peace, development, and stability efforts. He also agrees that it is sometimes necessary for the military to step in and deal with situations police cannot handle. Even so, he argues for limits and caution.

I would just say the appropriate role is for the military to do the minimum necessary; but, on the other hand, one has to recognize the practicabilities of certain situations. That brings us now from the philosophical to the pragmatic. It seems to me that there are certain types of practical situations which call for the limited utilization of military forces in the counter-

narcotics struggle. Clearly, one of them is in situations where the traffickers are using blatantly military means. I mean, how can you argue that if the traffickers are basically military force, that we can't use military force to counter them? You have to fight fire with fire . . . But still, even under these circumstances, I think there must be constraints. I don't think that counternarcotics should be the core military mission. I think that such missions as are undertaken should be viewed as temporary or transitional.

Bruce Bagley finds himself in basic agreement with Ambassador Negroponte, but takes his argument for limits and caution another step toward the strategic reality.

The first thing I would emphasize is the whole issue of alternative development . . . To spray, to eradicate crops, is to leave people with nothing and to create a recruitment program for the FARC (a Colombian insurgent force), nothing else . . . Under these circumstances, a serious alternative development program, which will cost billions—sometimes called the Mini-Marshall Plan by a variety of countries in the region—seems to me the *sine qua non* of any serious effort at drug control over the long-term . . . Without it, we're going to be back here 5 years from now talking about the role of land forces in the war on drugs once again . . . I think institution building, in the largest sense, is the second major priority. One where the military has some role, but where other, mainly civilian agencies, have critical roles.

These discussions of the strategic application of military power to the Latin American threat environment take the United States back to the issues of civil-military relations and U.S.-Latin American cooperation.

Suffice it to say here that solutions to national and international security issues involving contemporary defense, democracy, development, drug trafficking, and stability and instability are too important and too big for only one or a few institutions of a society—or even a few societies—to confront. Governance, socio-economic justice, and stability requirements demand integrated strategic political, economic, social, and diplomatic—as well as

military and police efforts. Moreover, to exclude the expertise and the resources of an institution—even a distrusted military—that could be used to help generate necessary reforms and development solutions to national and regional security and stability problems would be a terrible waste of scarce resources.

These would be but two of several reasons that provide added strength to the case for continued, sustained, and active engagement in Latin America. It would appear, then, that leadership in the U.S.-Latin American security context requires a long-term commitment and a continuing dialogue on the part of all the parties to the issue.

Civil-Military Relations Now and for the Future.

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the international security system and the verities that shaped U.S. and Western national purposes, policies, strategies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. In place of the predictable Cold War international structure, we now have a world of dangerous uncertainty and political ambiguity in which time-honored concepts of security and the classical military means to attain it, while necessary under some circumstances, are no longer sufficient. As a consequence, it is important to revisit some of the imperatives of contemporary inter-agency and multinational counternarcotics and stability operations. It is also important to consider the implications of what we know about the role of military forces in counternarcotics and stability operations in the future.

Retired U.S. Army General William W. Hartzog points out that:

- These kinds of operations are not the usual one, two, or three year short-term commitment—“Historically, it hasn’t been, and likely won’t be.”

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- Counternarcotics operations for Latin America have not been very well-funded, yet better funding is necessary to carry out the given tasks.
 - Consensus measures of effectiveness have been lacking, but are necessary to determine progress or lack of it.
 - The counternarcotics problem is a supply and demand problem, thus, in addition to cutting supply, we must also educate our youth to help cut demand.
 - The military is not the lead agency in the counternarcotics arena, but the armed forces have a role—"it is a support role."
 - You have to work hard to make support compatible with training for larger, hot wars—it is possible, and it can be done.

Clearly these points reflect strategic realities in the use of armed forces in Latin America—and elsewhere. These realities direct attention to at least two current and future requirements. First, it is necessary to prepare adequately for a long-term commitment. Second, it is important to appreciate the fact that the armed forces can and will play a positive but limited role in support of other U.S. agencies and allied countries in promoting defense, democracy, development; and more effectively controlling illegal drug trafficking.

Regarding the future, specifically, General Hartzog acknowledges the likelihood that illegal drugs—probably more in the form of synthetics than natural substances—will continue to generate broad societal problems 10 to 15 years from now. His summary of the situation is succinct: "I don't know if this is our future, but I do know that there is a role for the land force in it. It is not a straightforward one. It does impact on the readiness of

forces to do other things. It has to be managed carefully, but, in my judgement, it cannot be avoided."

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